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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 970462-CA

MICHAEL JAMES FISK, III,

:

Priority No. 10

v.

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals the magistrate's interlocutory order
denying his motion to dismiss one count of child abuse, a second
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2)(a)
(1995) .

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §

78-2a-3 (2) (d) (1996) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the State's proffer of new evidence and the

magistrate's finding that the prosecutor acted in good faith when
she failed to present that evidence at the original preliminary
hearing satisfy the State v. Brickey requirements for refiling
the charge previously dismissed for insufficient evidence?
Defendant's claim raises an issue of the proper legal
interpretation of the Brickey rule.

Therefore, the issue is a

question of law reviewed for correctness.

See State v. Pena, 869

P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
2.

Is defendant's appellate argument that the magistrate
1

clearly erred by finding that the prosecutor acted in good faith
properly before this Court when defendant did not make that
argument to the magistrate?
Defendant's appellate argument is not properly before the
Court because he did not present it to the lower court.

See

State v. Bywater. 748 P.2d 568, 569 (Utah 1987).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Addendum A contains the texts of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109
(1995) ; rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; and rule 59,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By information filed in March 1995, the State, through the
Salt Lake District Attorney's Office, charged defendant and his
wife, Melissa Fisk, with one count each of second-degree felony
child abuse, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2) (a)
(1995) (R. 13-14, 139). At the conclusion of the preliminary
hearing, the magistrate refused to bind defendant and his wife
over for trial (R. 14; Tr. July 18, 1995 at 113). The magistrate
found that the State had established probable cause to believe
that the two-year-old victim, D.S., had suffered non-accidental
injuries, but had not established probable cause to believe that
either defendant or his wife inflicted those injuries (id.).
By information dated January 29, 1997, the State, through
the Utah Attorney Generalfs Office, recharged defendant with
child abuse (R. 8 ) . Defendant moved to dismiss the information,
contending that State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) barred
2

recharging him with child abuse (R. 99) .

The magistrate denied

his motion (R. 361). l
This Court granted defendant's petition for interlocutory
review of that order (R. 374). There has been no preliminary
hearing on the refiled charge; the only issue on this appeal is
whether the magistrate properly denied the motion to dismiss.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State has charged defendant with shaking two-year-old
D.S. so severely that the resulting brain damage has left D.S. in
a vegetative state.
Introduction
D.S.fs mother and defendant's wife, Melissa Fisk, have known
each other since they were teenagers (R. 124; Juv. Ct. Hearing at
141) .2 According to Ms. Fisk, D.S.'s mother had difficulty

2

The January 29, 1997 information recharged both defendant
and his wife (R. 8 ) . The State charged defendant with two counts
of second-degree felony child abuse, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-109(2) (a) (1995), and one count of class A
misdemeanor child abuse, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5109(3) (a) (1995) (R. 9-10). The State charged Ms. Fisk with one
count of second-degree felony child abuse, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2) (a) (1995), and one count of class A
misdemeanor child abuse, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5109(3)(a) (1995) (R. 10-11).
Both defendants filed motions to dismiss the information (R.
99, 191). The magistrate granted Ms. Fisk's motion (R. 361).
The magistrate also dismissed two of the counts charged against
defendant (id.). The magistrate allowed the State to proceed
against defendant on one count only (id.).
2

Portions of the juvenile court proceedings have been
included in the record as exhibits to Ms. Fisk's motion to
dismiss. However, those pages do not have separate record
numbers. The State will refer to those pages as "Juv Ct
Hearing." The transcript pages are in volume 2 of the pleadings

files.
3

caring for D.S. and his two older siblings (Juv. Ct. Hearing 14142).

Consequently, in October and November 1994, defendant and

his wife began taking D.S. and his two siblings to stay with them
and their three children for two to three day periods (juv. ct.
hearing 146).
In early December 1994, D.S. and his siblings moved in with
defendant and his family (id. at 55). On February 1, 1995,
defendant and his wife undertook legal guardianship of D.S. and
his two siblings (id.).
Ms. Fisk began reporting problems with D.S. in early March
1995.

She reported to various health care professionals that

D.S. head-banged, exhibited seizure-like activity where he would
fall to the floor, screamed, and forced himself to lose
consciousness (Juv. Ct. Hearing at 60-68, 92, 97, 99, 106-107,
110-11, 114, 140, 156-57, 166).
Facts available prior to the 1995 preliminary hearing.
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on March 19, 1995, defendant and
his wife brought D.S. to the Primary Children's Medical Center
emergency room in cardiorespiratory arrest; doctors successfully
resuscitated him (Tr. July 18, 1995 at 11). A CT scan revealed
bleeding over the surface of D.S.!s brain and substantial retinal
bleeding (id. at 25, 27-28).

D.S.'s brain swelled so much that

the swelling separated the sutures in his skull (id. at 25-26) .
These injuries indicated that D.S. had suffered a violent shaking
within the last week (id. at 35-36, 57-58).
D.S. had additional injuries of varying ages.
4

D.S. had

other retinal hemorrhages that appeared older than the fresh
hemorrhages observed on March 19th (Tr. July 18, 1995 at 66) .
D.S. had linear bruises of different ages spanning his forehead
(Tr. July 18, 1995 at 15-16, 39). These bruises resulted from
having his head forcefully pressed against a linear grid and not
from head-banging (id. at 16).
D.S. had a pinching bruise on both the inside and outside of
his left ear lobe (id. at 17). The bruise could not have
resulted from a blow, unless D.S. had received a blow on the
outside of the earlobe, then a blow in the same place with the
ear folded over (id. at 62).
D.S. had several bruises of varying ages indicating that he
had been grabbed forcefully.

Those included bruises on his right

forearm, a bruise above the right elbow, three circular bruises
on his right leg, circular bruises on his left and right elbows,
and circular bruises on the lateral aspect of his left knee (id.
at 18-24, 62-64) .
D.S. had bruises over the bony prominences of back caused by
having his back pushed against a hard surface (id. at 20).
A CT scan of D.S.fs abdomen revealed calcified tissue in
front of the vertebrae (id. at 26-27).

The calcified tissue was

scarring from a prior severe extension or compression of the
spine, as in shaking D.S. or folding his body, which causes the
tissue to tear and bleed (R. 27, 36-37) .
Finally, D.S. appeared unusually small for a two-year-old
(id. at 24).
5

The record contains three reports of interviews with
defendant and Ms. Fisk conducted after they brought D.S. to the
emergency room.

In those reports, both defendant and Ms. Fisk

agreed that Ms. Fisk fed D.S. oatmeal sometime in the afternoon
before they brought D.S. to the hospital March 19th (R. 124, 126,
131).

However, they gave varying accounts about what happened

after D.S. finished eating the oatmeal.

They reported to a

social worker that, after Ms. Fisk fed D.S., D.S. began throwing
himself down, so defendant put D.S. in another room and
periodically checked on D.S. (R. 125). On one of these checks,
defendant discovered that D.S. had stopped breathing (id.)
Defendant reported to an investigating officer that Ms. Fisk
was feeding D.S. oatmeal in the bedroom when D.S. began throwing
up and screaming (R. 127). Defendant claimed that he took D.S.
out of his high chair and put D.S. on his side so that he would
not aspirate the vomit (id.).

Defendant was observing D.S.'s

breathing when D.S. stopped breathing (id.).

The report does not

state that defendant was alone in the room with D.S. when D.S.
stopped breathing.
Ms. Fisk reported to one of the investigating officers that,
after D.S. finished eating, he screamed and passed out (R. 131).
D.S. came to, fell over once, then made himself pass out again
(id.).

According to Ms. Fisk, she told defendant to watch D.S.,

then left the room (R. 131, 137-38).

The next thing she knew,

defendant came out of the room with D.S. and told her to get the
keys so that they could take D.S. to the hospital (R. 137). She
6

did not specify how much time passed between the time she left
the room and when defendant brought D.S. out.
At the 1995 preliminary hearing, the State relied on D.S.'s
old and new injuries to support its child abuse charges against
defendant and Ms. Fisk.

A medical expert testified about the

approximate age of the injuries, and that they could not have
resulted from accidental trauma (Tr. July 18, 1995 at 20-22, 2628, 38-40, 57-58, 66-67).

However, she could testify only that

the newer injuries occurred within one week prior to March 19th,
and the older ones occurred more than one week before that date
(id, at 20-22, 26, 57-58).

Most importantly, she testified only

that the massive brain injury that doctors observed on March 19,
1995, could not be more than one week old (id. at 26) .
An investigating officer testified that defendant reported
that only he and Ms. Fisk cared for the children (id. at 105).
The officer testified that she "assumed" that defendant and Ms.
Fisk were D.S.!s primary caregivers (id. at 105-106).

However,

she could not testify about the number of hours during the day
defendant was home with the children, and she acknowledged that
she asked no questions on that subject (id. at 106-107) .
The magistrate found the evidence sufficient to establish
probable cause to believe that D.S.fs injuries were intentionally
inflicted rather than accidentally inflicted (id. at 113).
However, the magistrate found that the evidence failed to
establish that either defendant or his wife caused those injuries
(id.).

Consequently, the magistrate dismissed the information at
7

the conclusion of the July 18, 1995 preliminary hearing.
Facts available after the 1995 preliminary hearing.
Approximately four months after the 1995 preliminary hearing
dismissal, during November 1995 juvenile court proceedings, Ms.
Fisk gave her first sworn testimony about the events of March 19,
1995 (Juv. Ct. Hearing at 54). 3 For the first time, she included
a detailed chronology of the critical period before she and
defendant took D.S. to the hospital.

Ms. Fisk testified that she

began feeding D.S. in the bedroom at approximately 3:15 p.m.
while defendant sat in the room (id. at 72-74).

She finished

feeding D.S. by 3:30 p.m. (id. at 73). After she finished, she
began brushing D.S.fs teeth when D.S. screamed until he passed
out (id. at 74). She took D.S. out of the high chair, put him on
the floor, then left him in the room with defendant (id.).
Approximately thirty minutes later, defendant brought D.S. out of
the bedroom in cardiac arrest; he and Ms. Fisk took D.S. to the
emergency room (id. at 75-77).

This is the first evidence in the

record establishing the thirty-minute period during which
defendant had exclusive control over D.S.
Also sometime after the 1995 preliminary hearing, the Salt
Lake District Attorney's office turned the case over to the Utah
Attorney General's Child Abuse Unit.4

The attorney general's

defendant also testified; however, defendant has not
included his juvenile court testimony in this record (Juv. Ct.
Hearing at 195)
4

The record does not clearly establish when the Utah
Attorney General's office received the case.
8

office developed evidence in addition to that obtained at the
juvenile court proceedings.

Most importantly, the attorney

general's office obtained an expert opinion from Dr. Marion
Walker, a neurosurgeon at Primary Children's Medical Center (R.
116).

Dr. Walker's May 1, 1997 opinion letter is attached as

addendum B.

Dr. Walker noted that a CT scan performed on March

3, 1995 showed no evidence of brain damage (id.).

However, at

the time of his March 19th admission, D.S. had fresh bleeding
over the surface of the brain and retinal hemorrhages in the eye
grounds (id.).

Dr. Walker opined that D.S. could not have

sustained this massive brain injury at the time Ms. Fisk claimed
that D.S. was awake, alert, eating, and fussing (id.).

The

injury must have occurred sometime between that time and when
defendant came out of the bedroom with D.S. in cardiorespiratory
arrest (id.).5
Dr. Walker concluded that only a shaking and bashing could
have caused these injuries (R. 117). He elaborated that even a
prior head trauma could not explain the magnitude of the injury
to D.S.'s brain (R. 116).
On the strength of Ms. Fisk's sworn testimony and Dr.
Walker's expert opinion, the State refiled child abuse charges
against defendant for the March 19, 1995 shaking (R. 8). In
response to defendant's Brickey motion, the State proffered this
additional evidence to the same magistrate who had previously
5

A follow-up MRI study performed November 1995 showed a
substantial loss of brain matter caused by the March 19th injury

(id*).
9

dismissed the child abuse charge for insufficient evidence (R.
264-65).

The State contended that this evidence now established

that defendant had exclusive control over D.S. when D.S. suffered
the shaking that destroyed his brain (R. 266-68) .
The magistrate stated that the case could have been bound
over if the State had presented this additional evidence at the
1995 preliminary hearing (R. 315, 360). The magistrate further
found that the State could have discovered the additional
evidence prior to the 1995 preliminary hearing (R. 359-361).
However, he also found that the State acted in good faith in
presenting its case at the 1995 preliminary hearing, and that Dr.
Walker's testimony "may11 be "new evidence" within the meaning of
Brickev (R. 315, 360-61) .

Consequently, the magistrate ruled

that the State could proceed against defendant on the child abuse
charge for the March 19, 1995 shaking (R. 361).

Copies of the

magistrate's oral ruling (R. 315) and his Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law are attached as addenda C and D respectively.
The argument sections contain additional relevant facts.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Magistrate's Brickey ruling.

The magistrate correctly

interpreted the "other good cause" requirement in State v.
Brickev, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), to include the original
prosecutor's innocent underestimation of the necessary evidence
to establish probable cause.

First, dicta in

Brickey clearly

anticipates that such an underestimation amounts to "good cause"
as the supreme court used that phrase.
10

Second, the magistrate's interpretation furthers the
purposes of Brickey without permitting defendant to escape
prosecution for a well-grounded claim.

Brickev merely protects a

defendant against State abuses such as refiling groundless claims
in the hope that some magistrate will eventually bind a defendant
over for trial, or presenting a minimal case at the preliminary
hearing with the purpose of inappropriately hiding evidence from
a defendant.

However, when a prosecutor fails to discover or

present evidence because she has underestimated the evidence
necessary to establish probable cause, the abuses against which
Brickey protects are not implicated.
Moreover, the magistrate correctly interpreted the "new
evidence" requirement in Brickey to include the additional
evidence that the State proffered in this case.

The most logical

definition of "new evidence" as Brickey uses that phrase is
evidence not presented at a prior preliminary hearing that the
State did not hold back in order to deceive defendant about its
existence.

The additional evidence proffered in this case meets

that criteria.
2.

Magistrate's finding of good faith.

For the first time

on appeal, defendant contends that there is no basis in the
evidence to support the magistrate's finding that the prosecutor
acted in good faith.

Defendant waived this argument because he

failed to present it to the magistrate.
Alternatively, the record contains sufficient evidence to
support that finding.

Therefore, the magistrate did not clearly
11

err in making it.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE MAGISTRATE PROPERLY PERMITTED THE STATE TO RECHARGE
DEFENDANT FOR CAUSING D.S.'S MASSIVE BRAIN INJURIES
BECAUSE THE STATE INNOCENTLY UNDERESTIMATED THE PROOF
NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE AT THE 1995
PRELIMINARY HEARING, AND BECAUSE THE STATE PROFFERED
NEW EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE
THAT DEFENDANT CAUSED THOSE INJURIES
A preliminary hearing magistrate must dismiss an information
and discharge a defendant if the State ! s evidence fails to
establish probable cause to believe that a defendant committed
the charged crime.

Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(3).

However, "[t]he

dismissal and discharge do not preclude the State from
instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense."

Id.

Although the rule's plain language places no restrictions on
the State's ability to refile a dismissed charge, the Utah
Supreme Court has held that state due process does.

In State v.

Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), the supreme court held that,
after a magistrate has dismissed a charge for insufficient
evidence, state due process precludes refiling the same charge
unless the State shows that it has new or previously unavailable
evidence, or that other good cause exists for refiling.

Id. at

647.
In this case, the State proffered the following evidence in
addition to that presented at the 1995 preliminary hearing: 1)
Ms. Fisk's sworn testimony that finally detailed the events that
occurred between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on March 19, 1995; and
12

2) Dr. Walker's opinion that D.S. could not have been alert,
eating, and fussing at 3:00 p.m. if he had already been shaken
(R. 116, 264-66, Juv. Ct. Hearing at 72-77) . Based on that
evidence, the State contended that it could now establish that
defendant had exclusive control over D.S. at the time that D.S.
suffered the shaking that destroyed his brain (R. 266-68).
The same magistrate who previously refused to bind defendant
over at the conclusion of the 1995 preliminary hearing permitted
the State to proceed on the new child abuse charge.

The

magistrate found that the State could have discovered evidence
establishing defendant's exclusive control over D.S. when D.S.
was shaken and that the evidence would have resulted in a
bindover at the 1995 preliminary hearing (R. 360-61).

However,

the magistrate found that the State acted in good faith in its
presentation at the 1995 preliminary hearing and without any
intent to deceive either the court or defendant (R. 360-61).

The

magistrate also concluded that Dr. Walker's testimony "may"
amount to new evidence (R. 3 61).
Defendant contends that acting in good faith cannot, as a
matter of law, satisfy the Brickey "good cause" prerequisite to
refiling a previously dismissed charge.
11.

Appellant's Brief at 9-

Defendant also contends that the magistrate incorrectly

interpreted "new evidence" to include Dr. Walker's opinion
testimony.

Appellant's Brief at 5 n.3.

Normally, the appellate courts review a lower court's good
cause determination for an abuse of discretion.
13

See, e.g. State

v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah App 1992) (trial court's
determination whether good cause exists for withdrawing guilty
plea reviewed for abuse of discretion), cert, denied, 853 P.2d
897 (Utah 1993); State v. Pursifell. 746 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah App.
1987) (indigent defendant must show good cause for appointment of
substitute counsel; decision whether to appoint substitute
counsel review for abuse of discretion).

However, this case does

not raise issues about whether the specific facts of this case
satisfy the legal standards articulated in Brickey.

Rather,

defendant challenges only the magistrate's legal interpretations
of "other good cause" and "new evidence."

Therefore, defendant's

claim presents a legal question reviewed for correctness.

See

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) ("legal
determinations" are rules applied uniformly to similarly situated
persons and are reviewed for correctness).
The magistrate correctly interpreted "other good cause" and
"new evidence," as Brickey uses those phrases, and properly ruled
that "other good cause" and "new evidence" justified refiling the
child abuse charge against defendant.

Brickey admittedly

provides little detail on the meanings of "new evidence,"
"previously unavailable evidence," or "other good cause."
Similarly, no additional cases from either the supreme court or
this Court have clarified the circumstances that satisfy the
Brickey restrictions.
Brickey does state in dicta, however, that "other good
cause" can mean an innocent miscalculation of the necessary
14

quantum of evidence to obtain a bindover.
That dicta applies to this case.

Id. at 647-48 n. 5.

In the context of Brickey, this

dicta specifically refers to a prosecutor who has additional
evidence, but does not present it because she has miscalculated
how much evidence is necessary to establish probable cause.

The

Brickey court cited to Harper which referred to a prosecutor's
innocent decision not to put on some of its evidence:
It was not intended, nor is it expected, in order
to show probable cause, that in all cases the
prosecution must present its entire case before the
examining magistrate. That is a decision to be reached
by the district attorney . . . in the event the
prosecutor miscalculates and fails to present
sufficient evidence to show probable cause to bind over
the accused, but possesses other witnesses whose
testimony would strengthen his showing, it is clearly
within the discretion of the examining magistrate to
grant the state a continuance for that purpose.
Harper v. District Court, 484 P.2d at 897 (emphasis added).
In this case, the original prosecutor's insufficient
investigation led to the dismissal of the first information.

The

magistrate found that the original prosecutor could have
discovered the evidence that established that defendant shook
D.S. through the exercise of ordinary diligence, and that that
evidence would have resulted in a bindover at the conclusion of
the 1995 preliminary hearing (R. 359-60).

However, the

magistrate also found that the prosecutor's "failure to discover
the evidence and the failure to present more compelling evidence
regarding the timing of the injury and the exclusivity of control
over the victim by Michael Fisk was done innocently and in good
faith" (id.) (emphasis added).

Regardless of whether the
15

innocent miscalculation results from insufficient investigation
or failure to produce evidence that the prosecutor has alreadyobtained, it is the prosecutor's innocent underestimation of the
critical evidence necessary to establish probable cause that
creates the "good cause" anticipated by the Brickey and Harper
dicta.
There is no substantive difference between the Brickey dicta
and prosecutor's good faith actions in this case.

Consequently,

the magistrate correctly ruled that "other good cause" within the
meaning of Brickey includes the prosecutor's innocent
underestimation of the necessary evidence to bindover a
defendant, and that "good cause" for refiling the charges existed
in this case (R. 360-61).

State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647 n.5

(dicta) (innocent miscalculation establishes other good cause
justifying a continuance) (citing Harper v. District Court, 484
P.2d 891, 897 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (dicta)); State v. Rivera,
871 P.2d 1023, 1026 n.4 (Utah App. 1994) (dicta) (an innocent
miscalculation of the necessary quantum of evidence justifies
refiling), rev'd on other grounds, 906 P.2d 311 (Utah 1995).
Moreover, the circumstances in Brickey and the basis for the
supreme court's decision also establish that the magistrate
correctly interpreted "other good cause" to include an innocent
underestimation of the evidence necessary to establish probable
cause.

The supreme court began its analysis in Brickey by

restating the purpose of a preliminary hearing: to ferret out
groundless and improvident prosecutions.
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Id. at 646.

The court

noted the importance of this function to protect a defendant from
the degradation and expense of trial, to conserve judicial
resources, and to promote confidence in the judicial system.

The

supreme court further reasoned that granting the State unlimited
discretion in determining whether to refile charges raised the
intolerable specter of the State harassing a defendant who had
previously had the charges dismissed for insufficient evidence.
Id. at 646-47.

Moreover, the dicta interpreting "good cause" to

include an innocent miscalculation of the necessary evidence to
establish probable cause negatively infers that the State cannot
purposefully hold back crucial evidence in an effort to ambush a
defendant with it at trial.

Id. at 647 n.5.6

This reasoning, taken as a whole, establishes that the
supreme court fashioned the Brickey rule to protect against two
potential abuses: 1) the State harassing a defendant by
continually refiling groundless claims; and 2) the State
purposefully withholding critical evidence in order to improperly
impair a defendant's pre-trial discovery rights.

6

Defendant attempts to distinguish the Brickey dicta by
contending that it permits only a continuance, not a refiling.
Appellant's Brief at 8-9. His analysis ignores this Court's
recognition in Rivera that the innocent miscalculation also
justifies refiling. It also ignores the context of the dicta.
As established in the text, the dicta specifically refers to a
prosecutor's innocent failure to produce some of the evidence
that it already has. In that circumstance, a continuance
provides a sufficient remedy. However, when the State has
innocently failed to discover or develop the evidence necessary
for a bindover, refiling provides the only sufficient remedy.
Contrary to defendant's argument, the "other good cause"
anticipated by those cases is the innocent miscalculation, not
the remedy for it.
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When considered in light of these policy considerations, the
magistrate correctly interpreted "other good cause" to include
the prosecutor's innocent underestimation of the evidence
necessary to establish probable cause.

Defendant does not face

harassment by the second filing of a groundless claim.

To the

contrary, the magistrate found that it would have bound the case
over if the State had presented the additional evidence at the
1995 preliminary hearing (R. 360). Unlike the prosecutor in
Brickey, the State did not present the same evidence to a
different magistrate to obtain a bindover; it presented
additional evidence to the same magistrate to establish that the
claim was not groundless.7
Similarly, the magistrate found that the prosecutor did not
act maliciously, in bad faith, or with intent to deceive either
defendant or the court, and defendant does not contend to the
contrary.

This case does not present the problem of a prosecutor

trying to improperly hide evidence from defendant.

Because a

7

The magistrate also acknowledged that, based on this
evidence, it appeared that defendant had committed a very serious
crime (R. 315). Defendant complains that "the fact that this
statement was made is unsettling at the least, and perhaps
indicative of extraneous considerations influencing the District
Court's deliberative process at worst." Appellant's Brief at 13
n.5. Defendant fails to explain how this consideration is
extraneous. To the contrary, given the purpose of ferreting out
groundless claims, it seems that the magistrate's belief that the
claim is well-grounded was important to its Brickey analysis.
Additionally, the magistrate gave defendant the option to
have a different magistrate preside at the second preliminary
hearing (R. 362) . Defendant has exercised that option (R. 366) .
Therefore, the comment raises no concerns about this magistrate's
ability to make an impartial probable cause determination at any
subsequent preliminary hearing.
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good faith underestimation of the evidence does not implicate the
abuses against which Brickey protects, the magistrate correctly
concluded that it constitutes "other good cause" within the
meaning of Brickey.
Other cases also support the magistrate's ruling.

For

example, in Chase v. State, 517 P.2d 1142 (Okla. Crim. App.
1973), the prosecutor charged Chase with escape.

Id. at 1143.

At the initial preliminary hearing, a records officer from the
penitentiary testified that Chase was being held for
"safekeeping" rather than on a judgment.
magistrate dismissed the case.

Id.

Id.

Consequently, the

Subsequently, the State

discovered that the records officer had made a mistake, and that
Chase was being held on a valid judgment.

Id.

In Chase, as in

this case, the prosecutor technically had available to it
evidence that would have justified binding Chase over at the
original preliminary hearing.

However, the Oklahoma Court of

Criminal Appeals held that the state could proceed with the
second prosecution on the basis of the corrected evidence.

Id.

at 1143-44.
The Michigan Court of Appeals has gone so far as to permit
refilings based on prosecutorial neglect or ineptitude.

In

People v. Laslo, 259 N.W.2d 448 (Mich. App. 1977), the prosecutor
failed at two preliminary hearings to produce witnesses with
evidence critical to the probable cause determination.
450-51.

Id. at

The Michigan court rejected Laslo f s argument that it

violated due process to permit the third preliminary hearing and
19

resulting bindover.

The Michigan court reasoned that the

prosecutor had not engaged in forum shopping and had not failed
to produce additional evidence at the final, successful
preliminary hearing.

Id. at 451.

Rather, the court found that

the prior failures resulted from nothing more than prosecutorial
11

ineptness . "

Id.

Moreover, to support its holding, the Michigan court relied
on Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971): the same
case on which the Brickey court relied to limit the Statefs right
to refile charges.

Therefore, the Michigan court has interpreted

the same rule on which the Brickey court relied to permit
refilings when the first dismissal resulted from a prosecutor's
mistake.

See State v. Varcro, 362 N.W.2d 840, 843-44 (Mich. App.

1984) (no due process bar where prosecutor presented evidence
that he did not, but could have presented at first preliminary
hearing where failure to present it resulted from neglect rather
than deliberate attempt to harass defendant).

See also State v.

Bacon, 791 P.2d 429, 434-35 (Idaho 1990) (barring the State from
refiling requires an affirmative showing of bad faith).
Conversely, defendant cites no case, and the State is aware
of none, where a court has rejected a refiling based on an
innocent underestimation of the evidence.

Furthermore, the cases

holding that a prosecutor could not refile charges involve clear
prosecutorial abuses.

The prosecutors in Brickey and Jones

clearly engaged in forum-shopping by presenting the same evidence
at the subsequent preliminary hearings before different
20

magistrates.

State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d at 646-48; Jones v.

State, 481 P.2d at 171-72.

See also People v. Walls, 324 N.W.2d

136, 137-39 (Mich. App. 1982) (State improperly filed new
complaint and proceeded before new magistrate based on hearsay
evidence ruled inadmissible by first magistrate).

The magistrate

found that no such abuse occurred in this case.
Nevertheless, defendant argues that "other good cause"
cannot mean a prosecutor's good faith underestimation of the
evidence.

Appellant's Brief at 6-11.

According to defendant,

"other good cause" exists only when the State produces additional
evidence that it could not have discovered at the time of the
preliminary hearing through the exercise of ordinary diligence.
Brickey1s plain language contradicts defendant's contention
that "other good cause" can only mean the discovery of previously
undiscoverable evidence.

Brickey explicitly permits refiling

charges for "other good cause" as an alternative to permitting
refiling based on the introduction of new or previously
unavailable evidence; it does not define "other good cause" to
mean only the reliance on new or previously unavailable evidence.
State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647.
More importantly, defendant's interpretation that "good
cause" can mean only the discovery of previously undiscoverable
evidence divorces Brickey from its intended purpose.

Defendant

asks for an interpretation of the Brickey rule that seeks no
protection against prosecutorial abuse, and defendant had
identified no abuse in this case.
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Instead, defendant seeks to

use Brickey as a sword to obtain a windfall because he had the
good fortune to have his case assigned to a prosecutor who, in
good faith, underestimated the evidence necessary to obtain a
bindover.

Contrary to the purpose of the Brickey rule,

defendant's interpretation would undermine confidence in the
judicial system by allowing him to rely on a technicality to
escape prosecution on a charge for which the State has now
developed solid evidence.

See State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646

(identifying the promotion of confidence in the judicial system
as one of reasons a preliminary hearing ferrets out groundless
prosecutions).8
The magistrate also correctly concluded that the State's
additional evidence proffered in support of the new charge
constitutes "new evidence" within the meaning of Brickey.9
Defendant also argues that the supreme court rejected
relying on the prosecutors' good faith to protect a defendant's
due process rights. Appellant's Brief at 10-11 citing State v.
Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647. To the extent defendant implies that
Brickey has already rejected relying on a prosecutor's good faith
underestimation of the evidence, that implication misstates
Brickey. The cited portion of Brickey only rejected the State's
argument that a prosecutor's good faith exercise of her
unfettered discretion in refiling provided sufficient protection
for an accused. The supreme court did not hold that the
prosecutor's good faith underestimation in presenting the case at
a preliminary hearing would not constitute good cause for
refiling the same charges.
9

The magistrate ruled the Dr. Walker's testimony "may"
constitute "new evidence" (R. 361). The magistrate did not
expressly rule whether the Ms. Fisk's sworn juvenile court
testimony detailing the events of the 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.
period constituted new evidence; however, that is the most
logical inference from the magistrate's rulings. The magistrate
found that the State was proffering evidence that established
with more precision the timing of D.S.'s injuries and exclusivity
of defendant's control; evidence that would have resulted in a
22

Defendant argued below that the "new evidence" standard
applicable to obtaining a new trial should define what
constitutes "new evidence" under Brickey (R. 306-307).
Civ. P. 59(a) (4).

Utah R.

That standard would require the State to prove

that the prosecutor could not have discovered the additional
evidence proffered to support recharging defendant through the
exercise of ordinary diligence.

Id.

Brickey contradicts defendant's argument.

As defendant

conceded below, the standard he advocates applies in the context
of a motion for new trial (R. 306-307).

However, Brickey

recognized that a preliminary hearing, unlike a trial, does not
amount to "a full-blown determination of an accused's guilt or
innocence," and that, at the preliminary hearing, the State need
only present sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that
defendant committed the charged crime.
P.2d at 646.

State v. Brickey, 714

Furthermore, if it innocently fails to present

enough of its case, that failure does not preclude refiling the
charges.

State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647 n.5 (dicta); State v.

Rivera, 871 P.2d at 1026 n.4 (dicta).
Brickey only prohibits the State from refiling charges on
bindover if the State had presented it at the 1995 preliminary
hearing (R. 359-61). In any event, Ms. Fisk's sworn testimony,
under any definition, was "new evidence"
because
it did not exist
at the time of the 1995 preliminary hearing.
However, even if this Court disagrees that the magistrate
determined that the State had "new evidence" within the meaning
of Brickey, this Court may nevertheless affirm on that basis.
See, e.g., State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 356-57 (Utah 1996) (the
appellate courts may affirm the outcome in the trial court on any
legitimate basis).
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the same evidence or on the basis of evidence that the State
improperly held back for reasons other than an innocent
miscalculation of the necessary quantum.

Therefore, "new

evidence" within the meaning of Brickey means nothing more than
evidence additional to that presented at the original preliminary
hearing that the State did not hold back for some bad faith
purpose such as improperly hiding evidence from defendant.10
Under this criteria, Ms. Fisk's testimony and Dr. Walker's
opinion testimony constitute "new evidence."

The evidence is

additional to that presented to the same magistrate that
previously dismissed the information (Tr. July 18, 1995).

The

State did not hold back the additional evidence for some
unacceptable purpose (R. 360-61).

The proffer of this new

evidence justifies allowing the State to reprosecute defendant
for shaking D.S.
In sum, the magistrate correctly interpreted "good cause" to
refile a previously dismissed charge to include a prosecutor's
innocent underestimation at the first preliminary hearing of the

10

The procedural exigencies of a preliminary hearing also
support this definition of "new evidence." Generally, a
preliminary hearing must be held within ten days after charging
for an incarcerated defendant, and within thirty days after
charging for a defendant who it not incarcerated. Utah R. Crim.
P. 7(g)(2). This is often insufficient time for the State to
complete its entire investigation; the courts have implicitly
recognized this by not requiring the State to present its entire
case at the preliminary hearing. If, as in this case, the prepreliminary hearing investigation fails to provide sufficient
evidence for a bindover, the State should have the opportunity to
refile the charges if further investigation reveals additional
evidence. Any other rule would be unworkable under the short
period.
24

evidence necessary to establish probable cause.11
POINT II
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS APPELLATE CLAIM THAT THE
MAGISTRATE INCORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE ORIGINAL
PROSECUTOR ACTED IN GOOD FAITH BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED
TO PRESENT THAT CLAIM TO THE MAGISTRATE
Defendant also contends that the magistrate had no
evidentiary basis for finding that the original prosecutor acted
in good faith in presenting the State's case at the first
preliminary hearing.

Defendant waived this argument because he

never made it to the magistrate.
In his motion to dismiss, defendant argued that the State
had not satisfied the Brickey prerequisites to refiling the
charges against him because the State's additional evidence did
not constitute "new evidence" (R. 99-111).

In the course of that

argument, defendant contended that the prosecutor's failure to
introduce that evidence "indicate[d] that the State misunderstood
the best factual way to isolate when the brain injury occurred in
relationship to the retinal hemorrhaging, subdermal hematomas,
and separating of the sutures" (R. 106). Defendant also argued
that the State "may have misunderstood the significance of D.S.'s
ability to eat oatmeal, but this is not tantamount to these facts
being new or previously unavailable to the State" (R. 108).
u

Defendant also argues that the State's right to appeal
creates an alternative to refiling. To the extent that defendant
implies that the State's right to appeal precludes refiling, the
case law does not support his argument. State v. Jaeger, 886
P.2d 53 (Utah 1994) anticipates that the State will refile if it
can satisfy the Brickey standard. Id. at 54 ("a decision not to
bind over but rather to dismiss brings the case to an abrupt end
if the strict requirements of Brickey cannot be surmounted").
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Defendant attributed no nefarious motive to the prosecutor's
failure; to the contrary, he accepted that her misunderstanding
of the evidence led to the failure.
The State countered that defendant's argument described
nothing more than a prosecutor who had innocently miscalculated
the evidence (R. 270). The State argued, both in its memorandum
and at the oral argument, that the good faith prosecutor's good
faith constituted "other good cause" to permit refiling the
charges (R. 270-72, 392).
Defendant responded to this argument only by arguing that
the prosecutor's good faith was insufficient as a matter of law
to satisfy the "other good cause" requirement (R. 309-10, 38889).

However, defendant never argued alternatively that the

prosecutor acted in bad faith or that the State had failed to
prove that she acted in good faith.

Even when the magistrate

agreed in open court with the State's representation that the
original prosecutor acted in good faith, defendant made no
objection to the soundness of that conclusion.
For the first time on appeal, defendant argues in the
alternative that the magistrate's conclusion that the prosecutor
acted in good faith is unsound.

Defendant could have made this

argument to the magistrate, but chose not to.

Defendant cannot

seek reversal of the trial court on the basis of an argument that
he did not make to the magistrate.

See, e.g., State v. Bywater,

748 P.2d 568, 569 (Utah 1987) (where Bywater accepted without
challenge the trial court's reasons for imposing the sentence
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that it imposed on him, he could not challenge the sufficiency of
the findings to support that sentence); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d
65, 70 (Utah App. 1990) (appellate courts will not consider
arguments raised for first time on appeal).
Alternatively, the record rebuts defendant's argument that
the magistrate clearly erred in finding that the original
prosecutor acted in good faith.

First, the State proffered that

the prosecutor had acted in good faith, and the magistrate agreed
with that proffer (R. 270, 3 92).
the proffer was insufficient.

Defendant never suggested that

To the contrary, defendant

implicitly accepted the State's premise that the original
prosecutor innocently underestimated the evidence by arguing that
she misunderstood it.

The magistrate could legitimately conclude

that defendant did not dispute the original prosecutor's good
faith.
Second, the magistrate did not need an additional
evidentiary basis for his finding that the prosecutor acted in
good faith at the preliminary hearing.

The same magistrate who

made that finding presided over the preliminary hearing.

He had

already observed the prosecutor's efforts to obtain a bindover
and did not need additional testimony from the prosecutor about
her motives.
Moreover, the Statement of Facts establishes that the
original prosecutor presented the State's case in good faith
under the circumstances known to the prosecutor at that time.
The medical evidence established a series of injuries of varying
27

ages.

The investigative reports gave conflicting accounts of

defendant's activities during the critical period.

Indeed, those

reports obscure the critical timing of defendant's exclusive
control over D.S. (R. 125, 127, 131, 137-38).
Given these conflicting accounts and the evidence of
multiple injuries, the magistrate did not clearly err by finding
that the original prosecutor acted in good faith when she
underestimated the importance of proving defendant's exclusive
control over D.S. during a period that the investigative reports
had not yet clearly identified.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935

(Utah 1994) (questions of fact reviewed for clear error only).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons argued above, the State asks this Court to
affirm the magistrate's order denying defendant's motion to
dismiss.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
76-5.109. Child abuse.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Child" means a human being who is 17 years of age or less.
(b) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of a child which
impairs the physical condition of the child, including:
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin;
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion;
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's health or welfare
and which is not a serious physical iiyury as defined in this section.
(c) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury or set of injuries
which seriously impairs the child's health, or which involves physical
torture or causes serious emotional harm to the child, or which involves a
substantial risk of death to the child, including:
(i) fracture of any bone or bones;
(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of the brain,
whether caused by blows, shaking, or causing the child's head to
impact with an object or surface;
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot water, or those
caused by placing a hot object upon the skin or body of the child;
(iv) any injury caused by use of a deadly or dangerous weapon;
(v) any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted by the
same person, either at the same time or on different occasions;
(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body;
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in severe emotional
harm, severe developmental delay or retardation, or severe impairment of the child's ability to function;
(viii) any injury which creates a permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, limb, or
organ;
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease breathing, even if
resuscitation is successful following the conduct; or
(x) any conduct which results in starvation or failure to thrive or
malnutrition that jeopardizes the child's life.
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, having
the care or custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict serious
physical injury upon a child is guilty of an offense as follows:
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a felony of the
second degree;
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree;
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical iiyury or, having the care
or custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict physical injury
upon a child is guilty of an offense as follows:
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class A misdemeanor;
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor;
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class C misdemeanor.
(4) Criminal actions under this section may be prosecuted in the county or
district where the offense is alleged to have been committed, where the
existence of the offense is discovered, where the victim resides, or where the
defendant resides.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment
(a) Grounds* Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
?A??ie.S -J ?Ttte? stipulation The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entiy of the judgment

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Rule 7. Proceedings before magistrate.
(a) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant
shall appear before the court as directed in the summons.
(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest with or without
a warrant, the person arrested shall be taken to the nearest available magistrate for setting of bail. Kan information has not beenfiled,one shall be filed
without delay before the magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense.
(c) CI If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was
cox: ~ Jtted the person arrested shall without unnecessary delay be returnee ic the county where the crime was committed and shall be taken
before the proper magistrate under these rules.
(2) If for any reason the person arrested cannot be promptly returned to
the county and the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor for
which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under
Subsection 77-7-21(1), the person arrested may state in writing a desire to
forfeit bail, waive trial in the district in which the information is pending,
and consent to disposition of the case in the county in which the person
was arrested, is held, or is present.
(3) Upon receipt of the defendant's statement, the clerk of the court in
which the information is pending shall transmit the papers in the proceeding or copies of them to the clerk of the court for the county in which
the defendant is arrested, held, or present. The prosecution shall continue
in that county.
(4) Forfeited bail shall be returned to the jurisdiction that issued the
warrant.
(5) If the defendant is charged with an offense other than a misde.
meanor for which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as •£
conviction under Subsection 77-7-21(1), the defendant shall be taken
without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the county of aST
rest for the determination of bail under Section 77-20-1 and released o^
bail or held without bail under Section 77-20-1.
(6) Bail shall be returned to the magistrate having jurisdiction over the
offense, with the record made of the proceedings before the magistrate*
(d) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, upon
the defendant's first appearance, inform the defendant:
(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy^
(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the infor^
mation and how to obtain them;
(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court
without expense if unable to obtain counsel;
(4) of rights concerning pretrial release, including bail; and
(5) that the defendant is not required to make any statement, and that
the statements the defendant does make may be used against the defendant in a court of law.
(e) The magistrate shall, after providing the information under paragraph
(d) and before proceeding further, allow the defendant reasonable time and
opportunity to consult counsel and shall allow the defendant to contact any
attorney by any reasonable means, without delay and without fee.

(0 If the charge agaiiust the defendant ia a taisdemeaaat, the magistrate
shall call upon the defendant to enter a plea.
(1) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sentenced by the magistrate as provided by law.
(2) If the plea is not guilty, a trial date shall be set. The date may not
be extended except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held under these
rules and law applicable to criminal cases.
(g) (1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant may not be
called on to enter a plea before the committing magistrate. During the
initial appearance before the magistrate, the defendant shall be advised
of the right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives the
right to. a preliminary examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate shall order the defendant bound over to answer in
the district court.
(2) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the
magistrate shall schedule the preliminary examination. The examination
shall be held within a reasonable time, but not later than ten days if the
defendant is in custody for the offense charged and not later than 30 days
if the defendant is not in custody. These time periods may be extended by
the magistrate for good cause shown. A preliminary examination may not
be held if the defendant is indicted.
(hi W A. preliminary exaxainatiori ehall be held u&der the r\alee aad lawe
applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the burden
of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the
state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call witnesses, and
present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine adverse witnesses.
(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe
that the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has
committed it, the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be
bound over to answer in the district court. Thefindingsof probable cause
may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on
the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not properly
raised at the preliminary examination.
(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the
crime charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it,
the magistrate shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do not preclude the
gtate from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

(i) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either
o-rty, may exclude witnessesfromthe courtroom and may require witnesses
£ot to converse with each other until the preliminary examination is concluded. On the request of either party, the magistr - x may order all spectators
•a be excluded from the courtroom,
(j) (1) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district
court, the magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall
transmit to the clerk of the district court all pleadings in and records
made of the proceedings before the magistrate, including exhibits, recordings, and any typewritten transcript.
(2) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the sheriff, the magistrate shall execute the appropriate commitment order,
(k) (1) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material
witness in a pending case will not appear and testify unless bond is required, the magistrate may fix a bond with or without sureties and in a
sum considered adequate for the appearance of the witness.
(2) If the witness fails or refuses to post the bond with the clerk of the
court, the magistrate may commit the witness to jail until the witness
complies or is otherwise legally discharged.
(3) If the witness does provide bond when required, the witness may be
examined and cross-examined before the magistrate in the presence of the
defendant and the testimony shall be recorded. The witness shall then be
discharged.
(4) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent
hearing or trial when ordered to do so, the recorded testimony may be
used at the hearing or trial in lieu of the personal testimony of the witness.
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MR. CRAIG BARLOW
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
236 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CiTY, UT 84114
Re; Daniel Alex Shepherd
Dear Mr, Borlow:
As per your request. I have reviewed the medical records regordlng Daniel
Shepherd. Briefly summarized. Donle! was o two year old mole who was
brought to the Emergency Room at Primary Children's Medical Center on
March 19. 1995 comatose from a severe head injury. As you ore aware. the'e
is a pre-existing CT scan from March 3, 1995 which does not show any
evidence of brain damage. At the time he wos admitted to PCMC on
March 19.1995 he hod fresh Weeding over the surface of his brain and retinal
hemorrhages $eer\ in his eye grounds. This combination of Injuries li highly
indicative of a shaking injury.
Information from Daniel's caregivers indicates that in the morning of March 19.
1995 he was noted to be awoke, alert and was eating. He was noted to be
fussy but more was no other evlaence ot Illness. At approximately 4:00pm on
March 19. 1995 his father came from a closed room with Daniel In hfs arms ond
Daniel was cyanotic and not breathing. He wos brought to P C M C Emergency
Room in this condition.
The fact that Daniel was able to be awoke, alert and eating on the morning
of March 19. 1995 Jndlcotes that he had not yet sustained a massive brain
injury That is to say after the injury occurred this chifd would not have te^n
able to be awake or conscious. The fgct thaf he was noted to be awake and
responsive earner simpiy means the injury had not yet occurred. Based on the
Information available to me. Daniel's massive brain Injury occurred after he
was seen eating and fussing ond within hours to minutes of his cyanotic and
opnec condition at opproxtmotely 4:00pm.
Daniel has no other medical illness and no other injuries which would explain
deterioration from a pre-existing condition. Even if he had prior Uouma to his
head It would not explain the magnitude of Injury that was seen at the time
of his admission to the hospital. His follow up MRl study November 1995 shows
significant loss of brain substance (brain atrophy) secondary to the global Injury
lhat he sustained to his brain on March 19. 1995.
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Page Two
It is very unlikely ond almost impossfDie for the Injuries observed on the March
21, 1995 CT scan and November 1995 MRI study to hove been sustained by
any other mechanism other thon shoking ond boshing. The nature of the
retinal hemorrhages ond the location of the bleeding within and on the
surface of his brain Is so highly consistent with shaking injury thot there is
essentioHy no other explanation.
I nope this Information is helpful, Please fet me know jf I can provide any
further information to you.

ho<*f«wr/ mad Lioriadu

Sincerely yours,

A/f'AU &<£)
Marion l. Walker. M.D.. F.A.C.S.. F.A.A.P.

Professor and Head
Division of Pediatric Neurosurgery
University of Utah
Primary Children's Medical Center
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

4
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ORIO

Plaintiff,

6
7

e MA I

THE STATE OF UTAH,

MICHAEL & MELISSA FISK,

8

Vih\L

Case No. 971001743 FS

-vs-

BENCH DECISION, 6-30-97

Defendant*.
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BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 30th day

12

of June, 1997, at 9:00 o'clock a.m., this cause came

13

on for hearing before the HONORABLE STEPHEN HENRIOD,

14

District Court, without a jury in the Salt Lake

15

County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah.
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A P P E A R A N C E S :

18

For t h e S t a t e :

CRAIG BARLOW
Attorney at Law

For the Defendant:

CRAIG
Attorne
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Third Judicial District
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CAT by:

CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR

24

JUL 0 1 1997
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BENCH DECISION, 6-30-97

Page 3
Clearly, the State at the time of
preliminary hearing, didn't have Dr. Walkers'
opinion. And for whatever reason - and I think we
are talking about competence here, frankly — the
State didn't seem to know about the facts limiting
the period of the injury from the eating of the
oatmeal for a short period of time after that and
Mr. Fisk's proximity to the child during that time
period. In criminal cases, there are appeals raised
on ineffectiveness of counsel for the Defendant. I
think probably what we have here is ineffective
counsel for the State. And I think that amounts to
newly discovered evidence on the part of Dr. Walker
and/or its cause to a limited extent.
I am going to allow this case to go
forward on Count I in the Information against
Mr. Fisk, only. I think all the rest of it is
precluded by the ruling that was made in the original
preliminary hearing.
So that's my ruling.
MR. BARLOW: For clarification, Your
Honor: Do we then have a bindover or do we MR. BUGDEN: Well, there can't be a
bindover from that.
THE COURT: You have to have another
Page 4
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PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT: This is a troubling case.
And while this isnft addressed in Brickey, it
probably isn't relevant for me to even consider it.
And at this point and stage, it appears that Mr. Fisk
has committed a serious crime, and that's something
that you have to know weighs on any judge that's
looking at a situation like this as the Brickey
analysis goes forward.
I
There is no question in my mind but that
the facts existed and were discoverable upon which
this case could have been bound over after the
original preliminary hearing. At the same time, I
don't see any bad faith on the part of the State
whatsoever.
What I come down to is a combination of
things: One is, I don't think what the opinion
writer in Brickey meant when the word "unavailable"
was used is what we would normally think of as
"unavailable" would mean. And as a straight matter
of definition, "unavailable" would mean that the
evidence couldn't have been ferreted out. I think it
could have. I think what they mean is what should
the State have known, what ought the State have
known?

CARLTON WAY, CSR 801-535-5464

1
2
3
4
5
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preliminary hearing.
MR. BARLOW: Okay, that's just what I
was ~
THE COURT: And I'm not sure whether that
should be in front of me at this stage or not.
Clearly, this hearing had to be in front of me. And
I don't know. The case was filed in Murray; wasn't

8 it?
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MR. BUGDEN: I don't know.
MR. BRASS: It got sent to Murray, excuse
me, the way it works —
THE COURT: It was spun out.
MR. BRASS: -geographical.
THE COURT: What do you think,
Mr. Barlow, where should we schedule it?
MR. BARLOW: Well, I'm certainly
comfortable having it in front of you, Your Honor. I
don't know that there is - 1 guess I am concerned
that we not have a legal issue about whether you
should hear it or some other judge should hear it.
THE COURT: What's the Defense
perspective? What is fairer to Mr. Fisk, to have
another hearing in front of me when all this has
already gone on or to have a fresh face?
MR. BARLOW: I think that is a fair way
Page 1
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ADDENDUM D

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION II
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

CaseNo.97|01742FS

Plaintiff

v.
Judge Stephen Henrpid
MICHAEL JAMES FISK, III
MELISSA FISK,
Defendants.

A hearing on this case was held June 30,1997. Michael Fisk was present and represented
by Walter F. Bugden, Jr.; Melissa Fisk was present and represented by Edward K. Brass; the
State was represented by Craig L. Barlow, Assistant Attorney General. This case was originally
filed as a one-count information against both Defendants charging child abuse, a second-degree
felony and alleging that on or about between March 1,1995, and March 19,1995, the
Defendants, having the care and custody of Daniel Shepherd, intentionally or knowingly caused
or permitted another to inflict serious physical injury upon said child. The preliminary hearing
was held July 18,1995. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the Court ruled that the
injuries to the victim were non-accidental but that there was insufficient evidence to show that
the defendants caused the injury and dismissed the information. At the July 18,1995 preliminary

hearing, the State was represented by the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office. In 1997, the State
of Utah, through the Utah Attorney General's Office filed a second information against these
Defendants charging various crimes of child abuse during the same time as was alleged in the
first information. An initial hearing was held May 5,1997, to determine if the case warranted
further examination by the Court under State v. Brickev. 714 P.2nd 644 (Utah, 1986). The
parties have submitted memoranda addressing the filing of new charges. The Court has
considered these memoranda and heard arguments from Counsel. Based on the memoranda, the
arguments of Counsel, the Court's independent review of the record, and the Court's familiarity
with the case, because of the first preliminary hearing, the Court enters the following Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

There is probable cause to believe that a child, Daniel Shepherd, was injured by non-

accidental trauma on or about March 19, 1995.
2.

Information about the injuries to the child, the timing of the injuries, and the

exclusivity of control of Michael Fisk over the child when the injury likely occurred was
available to the State before the preliminary hearing in July, 1995.
3.

The evidence presented by the State at the July 18,1995, preliminary hearing was

not sufficient to show probable cause that the injuries were committed by one of the Defendants.
4.

Information, by way of proffer, has now been presented to the Court which indicates,

2

with more precision than was offered at the preliminary hearing, the timing of the injuries to
the victim and the exclusivity of control over the victim by Michael Fisk during the period of
time when the injuries most likely occurred.
5.

Presentation of the evidence by the State at the July 18,1995, was done in good

faith. However, the Court finds that the prosecutor failed to discover facts which through the
exercise of ordinary diligence could have been discovered; failed to present critical evidence
which could have established when the injury was inflicted and by whom the injury was
inflicted.
6.

The Court further finds that the facts existed and were discoverable through ordinary

diligence upon which this case could have been bound-over after the original preliminary
hearing. However, the failure to discover the evidence and the failure to present more
compelling evidence regarding the timing of the injury and the exclusivity of control over the
victim by Michael Fisk was done innocently and in good faith.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters the following conclusions of
law.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The State failed to present sufficient evidence at the July 18,1995, preliminary

hearing to show probable cause that the injury to the victim was caused by Michael Fisk.
2.

The failure to present sufficient evidence of probable cause regarding who

3

committed the crime was not done in bad faith, maliciously, or with an intent to mislead the
Court or defense counsel. Rather, it appears and the court concludes that facts which existed at
the time of the first preliminary hearing were discoverable in the exercise of ordinary diligence,
but were not presented as evidence at the first preliminary
3.

The testimony of Dr. Marion Walker may amount to newly discovered evidence or

good cause.
4.

The State's good faith failure to present discoverable evidence showing more precise

timing of the victim's injuries and the exclusivity of control of the victim by Michael Fisk
together with the State's current proffer regarding the timing of the injury and the exclusivity of
control by the defendant over the victim constitutes "other good cause" as discussed in State v.
Brickev 714 P.2nd 644 (Utah 1986).
5.

The Court concludes that Count 1 of the second information charging Michael Fisk

with child abuse, a second degree felony, may be presented to a magistrate consistent with State
v. Brickev 714 P.2nd 644 (Utah 1986) to determine if that charge should be bound over for trial.
6.

The additional charges of the second information, that is, Counts 2, 3,4, and 5

encompass the same period of time as was charged in the first information. These additional
charges could have been separated when the first information was filed and therefore, filing them
as separate charges is prohibited by the doctrine of single criminal episode..
7.

Counts 2, 3,4, and 5 are dismissed and the State is barred from refiling them, absent
4

an appeal by the State and reversal of this decision by the Court of Appeals.
8.

The Defendant Michael Fisk, through his counsel, may elect to have evidence in

support of count 1 of the second information presented before this Judge or may choose to have
another magistrate hear the additional evidence. If the Defendant elects to have another judge or
this Judge hear additional evidence regarding count 1, the Defendant must make that election on
the record and the Court will make a minute entry stating the election in light of State v. Brickey.
9.

This case appears to be a matter of first impression in its application of State v.

Brickey. The interests of justice and judicial economy will be served if this matter is reviewed
by interlocutory appeal. The Court concludes that no prejudice to either the State or the
defendant Michael Fisk will occur if an appeal is taken to the Utah Court of Appeals.
Dated this

3^~

day of July, 1997.

Judge Stephen Henrted
Approved as to form:

Craig L. BOTOW
Assistant Attorney General

Walter F. Bugden, Jr.
Attorney for Michael Fisk
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